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The failure of French Canadians to find 
a satisfactory place in Canadian military 
institutions has contributed to problems of 
national unity in the Twentieth Century. 
This paper suggests that this problem was 
faced in the formative years of the Cana· 
dian Militia and suggests the institutional 
circumstances in whicth it evaded solution. 
I. - THE MILITIA AS A NATIONAL INSTITUTION. 
A country's armed forces are usually reckoned among those natiOnal 
institutions which help to create a sense of collective identity and pride. 
It would he difficult to maintain that military institutions and warlike 
exploits have provided Canadians with many powerful unifying myths. 
Two world wars are recalled as periods of acute strain within the Cana-
dian duality. 
This problem in Canadian history is related to a complex array of 
factors. What is attempted here is an examination of a small part of the 
problem. What were the institutional factors which led the Canadian 
Militia, in its first, formative decades, to become so completely dominated 
by the English-speaking majority ? Other historians have portrayed the 
broader context in which this development took place; the purpose of 
this study is to look narrowly at the institution itself. 
Institutional considerations have an added importance because the 
Canadian Militia was consciously devised by a man acutely conscious 
of the need to make it fit the demands of both French and English-
speaking Canadians. Launching debate on the Dominion's first Militia 
Bill, Sir George Etienne Cartier described the new military institutions 
as "necessary for the completion of national greatness". 1 Conscious that 
suspicion of the new militia system was acute among some French-speaking 
members, he was careful to explain and justify the provisions of the Bill 
• Assistant Professor of History, University of Ottawa. 
1 Parliamentary Debates as Reported in the Globe (microfilm in the University of 
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in both languages. 2 Cartier, whose selection as first Minister of Militia 
and Defence had seemed a modest recognition for Macdonald's chief 
lieutenant, professed that he saw the creation of a national military 
system as a fitting culmination to his public life. 3 
II. - MILITIA ORGANIZATION: THE REPRESENTATIVE 
PRINCIPLE. 
The Militia Act of 1868 created the Department of Militia and Defence 
and established a basis for the military institutions of the new Dominion. 
Essentially, the act extended the military system of the old Province of 
Canada to the new provinces. The new Department contained a civil 
and a military branch, the former under a Deputy Minister, the latter 
under the Adjutant General. The Militia Act established that the senior 
military officer would be obtained from the British regular army. Until 
1904, the military command of the Canadian Militia was exercised by a 
series of senior British officers. 4 
Cartier's choice for Deputy Minister fell on George Futvoye, an 
elderly lawyer and civil servant from Quebec. Thereafter, the pattern 
was established that the post was held by French Canadians. Futvoye 
was followed in 1875 by a former Liberal senator, Colonel Charles Panet. 
When Panet died in 1898, he was replaced by Major L. F. Pinault, another 
Liberal politician from Quebec. In 1906, Pinault was succeeded by a 
former militia surgeon, Colonel {later Major General Sir) Eugene Fiset. 
A number of political heads of the Militia Department should have 
guaranteed respect for French-speaking interests. For eighteen of the 
forty-six years between Confederation and the outbreak of world war, 
the Militia portfolio was held by a Quebec minister. Three of them, 
Cartier, L. F. R. Masson and Sir Adolphe Caron were men who, by 
influence or service, could claim standing in the Cabinet. 
The first Militia Act divided the original four provinces of Canada 
into nine military districts. Three of these were in Quebec. The province 
Toronto library), 31 March 1868, p. 149. For the French version, see Sir Joseph TASSE, 
Discours de Sir Georges Cartier Barronet, accompagnes de notices (Montreal, 1893), p. 566. 
2 See, for example, Debates in The Globe, 21 April 1868, p. 177. 
3 John BoYD, Sir George Etienne Cartier, Bart., His Life and Times (Toronto, 1914), 
p. 283. 
4 In 1875, the Act was amended to raise the status of the military command. 
Thereafter, the British officers filled the appointment of Major General Commanding the 
Canadian Militia. The post of Adjutant General was open to Canadians, and was held for 
twenty-one years by Colonel Walker Powell. 
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was divided as carefully as possible into two predominantly French-
speaking districts, under French Canadian staff officers. The remaining 
district united the English-speaking militia of Montreal and the Eastern 
Townships. 5 The result was geographically untidy hut it offered some 
guarantee that militia units would he inspected by men who knew their 
language. 6 
Linguistic considerations governed the selection of staff for the new 
military districts. The need for representation was also recalled when 
the young Dominion prepared its first military expedition, the force 
sent to the Red River colony to secure it for Canada. Cartier planned 
that a battalion would he raised in each of the two central provinces. 
Lieutenant Colonel L. A. Casault, a French-speaking staff officer, was 
given command of the 2nd Quebec Battalion of Rifles. Most of his 
officers were also French-speaking although examination of the nominal 
rolls of the battalion suggest that a high proportion of the men in the 
ranks were English-speaking. 7 The difficulty in obtaining men from 
Quebec for service at the Red River helps explain why the hulk of the 
small Dominion garrison maintained in Manitoba from 1870 until 1877 
was recruited in Ontario and the Maritimes. 8 
A more persistent need for a permanent military force was created 
by the withdrawal of the British garrison from central Canada between 
1868 and 1871. To fill the role the British troops had played as models 
and instructors for the Canadian Militia, Cartier agreed to form two 
small batteries of artillery, one at Kingston, the other at the Citadel in 
Quebec City. Officers from the Royal Artillery were borrowed to command 
the new units. Captain (later Major General) Thomas Bland Strange, 
who took command at Quebec, found that two of his three Canadian 
5 Military District (M.D.) Number 5 included counties to the west of Montreal, 
such as Argenteuil, Pontiac and Ottawa, which were then heavily settled by English· 
speaking Quebeckers, as well as English-speaking Montreal and the Townships. M.D. 6 
included French-speaking Montreal and counties to the north of the predominantly English-
speaking areas. M.D. 7 included French and English battalions in Quebec City and 
French-speaking units in the northern half of the province. 
6 The only French-speaking unit in M.D. 5, the 2lst Richelieu Light Infantry, from 
the Saint-Jean area, languished and died in 1880. The 6th Fusiliers, a Montreal unit 
originally in M.D. 6, was transferred to M.D. 5. 
7 For comments on the Quebec battalion, see Offici,a/, Journal of the Red R iver 
Expedition, Public Record Office, London, W.O. 33/ 21/418, pp. 12 et seq. 
8 On the Manitoba Force, see Department of Militia and Defence, Militia Reports, 
1870-1877 passim (hereafter Militia Reports). See also C. P. STACEY, "The Military Aspect 
of Canada's Winning of the West, 1870-1885", Canadian Historical Review, vol. XXI, no. 1 
(March 1940) . 
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officers were French-speaking, as were more than half of his men. Strange 
developed a high opinion of his French Canadians, finding them willing, 
disciplined soldiers, inured to hardship and resourceful. The rough 
engineering skills of the logging camp were easily adapted to artillery 
work. 9 
III. - THE VOLUNTEER MILITIA : THE BASIC INSTITUTION: 
As Minister of Militia, Cartier had made it evident that he would 
work for a duality within the militia system. However, public policy had 
to he supported by private will. The key issue in the first years of 
Cartier's militia system was whether the ranks of the force could he filled 
by voluntary enlistment or whether compulsion would he necessary. 
Elaborate machinery for obligatory service, the product of nearly a 
century of militia legislation, had been taken over by the new Dominion 
in its new militia statute. It had come in the face of Opposition hostility, 
mobilized by the veteran Rouge leader, A. A. Dorion, 10 hut it was an 
opposition privately shared by Cartier himself. 11 In the face of pleas 
by militia commanding officers, even of his own staff appointees, Cartier 
was determined that the new Canadian Militia would stand or fall on a 
basis of voluntary service. 12 
Nowhere was the issue of a voluntary or a compulsory basis for the 
militia more acute than in Quebec. At the first enrolment after the 
Militia Act, 12,637 of the Dominion's 37,170 volunteers had been found 
in Quebec hut almost half of them came from the English-speaking 
district. 13 The officers commanding the two French-speaking districts 
pleaded for resort to the ballot with even greater urgency than their 
English-speaking colleagues. Lieutenant Colonel Antoine de Lothiniere 
Harwood reported : 
Several well-to-do persons have told me that they would willingly shoulder 
~he musket were they obliged to do so, but that their occupations would not 
9 T. B. STRANGE, Gunner Jingo's Jubilee (London, 1896), pp. 352-358. 
10 On Dorion and the Liberals, see CANADA, HousE OF COMMONS, Journals, 1868-
1869, pp. 342-343; Debates in The Globe, 12 May 1868, p. 236. 
11 For Cartier's views, see TASSE, Discours de Cartier, pp. 707-709; Chas P. Treadwell 
to Cartier, 25 September 1871 and enclosures, Public Archives of Canada, Cartier Papers, 
pp. 1393-1395. 
12 For views of staff officers, see Militia Report, 1871, Appendix, pp. 1 ff. For the 
views of militia officers, see Memorial to Cartier, 12 March 1870, Public Record Office, 
London, Carnarvon Papers, vol. 170, pp. 3-4. 
13 Militia Report, 1868, pp. 2-3. 
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allow them to voluntarily neglect their business and impair their 
fortunes ••• u 
Lieutenant General the Honorahle James Liilldsay, sent to Canada by 
the War Office to supervise the British withdrawal and to offer the Cana-
dians advice on their future defence arrangements, drew particular atten-
tion to the weakness of the French Canadian militia. Three battalions 
ordered out to meet a Fenian raid, with a total nominal strength of 1005 
men, had mustered only 358 strong. He noted that words of command were 
given in English and were then explained in French, a procedure he 
accepted, but he went on to complain that the staff officers chosen by Cartier 
sometimes did not know their drill in either language. 15 Some of Lindsay's 
criticisms were repeated two years later by Lord Dufferin, arriving in 
Canada to become Governor General. The French Canadian militia bat-
talions he inspected at Levis were filled with aged and undersized men. 16 
If good men were not forced to serve, officers had to fill their ranks with 
unsuitable recruits. 
The acute crisis over manpower in the militia resolved itself. The 
severe financial crisis which struck Canada in the mid 1870s meant sharp 
reductions in an already small defence expenditure. The strength of the 
force was cut and weak, dis-spirited units disappeared. A disproportionate 
number of French Canadian units were affected. Some, including the 
senior French Canadian battalion in the force, the 4th Chasseurs Cana-
diens, had already collapsed because of their failure to attract volun-
teers. 1 i Many others now followed them. 
The bitter financial stringency which dominated Canadian militia 
administration from 1875 until 1896 accentuated the differences between 
the English- and French-speaking units of the force. It also fostered a 
sharp distinction between city and rural units. Economy sharply limited 
training. By 1878, a pattern had developed which allowed city battalions 
to drill throughout the year in their own drill halls while rural units 
were assembled in two-week camps only every other year, sometimes even 
less frequently. The government intentionally gave an advantage to city 
corps, seeing their value as an auxiliary police force against rioters or 
14 I bid., 1871, p. 'l:l. 
15 Lt. Gen. James Lindsay to Sir John Young, 4 August 1870, Canadian Forces 
.Historical Section, Ottawa, W.0. 32/813/ 058/316. 
16 Dufferin to Kimberley, 5 July 1872, confidential, Public Record Office, London, 
<::.O. 537 /103, p. 294. 
17 Militia General Orders, no. 13, 23 May 1872. 
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strikers. In return, many city corps developed into lively, prosperous 
social and sporting clubs. Officers and frequently other ranks contributed 
their pay to regimental funds to buy elaborate uniforms, to finance 
excursions or to rent messes. 
Throughout the militia, a contrast developed between the smartly 
dressed, self-confident city corps and the shabby, ill-trained and aggrieved 
rural militia. 18 Even to keep a rural battalion together between the 
infrequent camps demanded enthusiasm and some financial outlay on 
the part of the officers. In Ontario, some county councils helped by making 
special contributions to the county battalion, but there is no record of 
such assistance elsewhere in Canada. 19 
The absence of government support was turning the militia into a 
rather expensive voluntary society. In most parts of Canada, the private's 
pay of fifty cents a day was only half the standard rate for a day labourer. 
Particularly in Quebec, undergoing a serious agricultural depression, it 
might be possible to find men willing to serve for such meagre pay, 20 
but it was much more difficult to find officers willing to pay for the 
privilege. In 1883, when Parliament was debating a possible increase in 
militia officers' pay, it was suggested that the extra money would be 
quickly passed on to the men. A Quebec M.P. observed that it did not 
happen that way in his part of the country. 21 A correspondent in the 
Canadian Militia Gazette alleged that in some French Canadian battalions, 
captains held on to the command of their companies until an advanced 
age, even refusing promotion, so that they could secure about $100 a year 
in government grants. 22 Lieutenant Colonel Gustave d'Orsonnens of the 
permanent infantry school at St. Jean waged fruitless war on commanding 
officers who insisted on sending him hopeless illiterates, men of bad 
18 "The Odd File" (Captain Greville HARSTON), The Militia of Canada (Toronto, 
1892), p. 20, has a rather light-hearted look at the rival attitudes. 
19 Some counties contributed 25f a day to the men's pay, others raised money to 
buy helmets, colours and band instruments. Another form of assistance was not limited to 
Ontario but was required by Militia Department regulations. A municipality had to 
contribute the land on which a drill shed or armoury would be built. 
20 Sir Adolphe Caron found it politically expedient to keep a large number of men 
of the 87th Battalion from his constituency as a garrison in the Citadel during the winter 
of 1885-1886, an alternative the men apparently preferred to work in the woods (Caron to 
Lt. Col. J. V. Laurin, 3 April 1886, Public Archives of Canada, Caron Papers, letterbook 15, 
p. 275). 
~1 CANADA, HousE OF COMMONS, Debates, 19 April 1883, p. 728 (Michel Auger). 
22 Canadian Military Gazette, vol. XII, no. 14, 21 July 1897, p. 9. 
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character and other social misfits in search of a winter's lodging at 
public expense. 23 
With rural units in a serious state of decline, even relative to the 
rest of Canada, it was unfortunate that there were only two French Cana-
dian city battalions, the 9th Voltigeurs of Quebec and the 65th Carabiniers 
Mont-Royal of Montreal. While these units went through periods of 
difficulty, they were in all respects on a par with the English-speaking 
city corps. 24 
French Canadians who regretted their relative weakness in the militia 
saw the need for additional French-speaking city battalions. In Montreal, 
with only one French Canadian battalion to five English-speaking units, 
plans were made to revive the defunct 4th Chasseurs. This time, it would 
be designed to appeal directly to a French Canadian military tradition 
by wearing Zouave uniform. 
This Franco-Algerian military costume had been made popular by 
'ihe'troops of the Second Empire. It had crossed the Atlantic to be adopted 
by some American militia units before the Civil War. Its main attraction 
for French Canadians was its connection with the Papal Zouaves, the 
contingent of faithful Canadian Catholics that had set off in 1869 to help 
defend the temporal power of the papacy. 25 Many leading French Cana-
dian military and political figures had helped to sponsor the Papal 
Zouaves and the expedition represented one of the few elements in a 
uniquely French Canadian military tradition. 
The proposal won the immediate support of the Honorable Louis 
Masson, the Minister of Militia. A former militia staff officer and now Mon-
treal's representative i.n the Cabinet, Masson had several motives for press-
ing the idea. The resistance did not come from his colleagues hut from the 
British to whom the proposal was referred. The Duke of Cambridge, the 
Commander-in-Chief and Queen Victoria's cousin had no intention of 
allowing any of Her Majesty's forces to he arrayed in what he regarded 
as a foreign fancy dress. British officials based their argument on the 
23 Militia Reports, 1885, pp. 175-179; 1886, pp. 171-175; 1887, p. 194. 
24 Writing of the Quebec dock labourers' strike in 1878, Dufierin explained to 
Mackenzie that while the local English-speaking battalion had been called out, the 9th, 
with many of its men recruited from disaffected districts, had not been trusted (Lord 
Dufierin to Alexander Mackenzie, 18 June 1878, Public Archives of Canada, Mackenzie 
Papers, M 199, p. 1950). The 9th Voltigeurs are currently the subject of doctoral research 
by Mr. Pierre Gravel at Laval University. 
25 On the Zouaves, see Leopold LAMONTAGNE, "Habits gris et chemises rouges", 
Report of the Canadian Historical Association, 1950. 
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agreed doctrine that militias both in Canada and in Britain were 
uniformed like regulars so that no enemy would know whether he faced 
irregular levies or well-disciplined professionals. Even if the Zouave 
promoters changed their colours from grey to scarlet, the costume was 
unacceptable. 
In the face of British intransigence, the scheme languished. Sir 
John A. Macdonald, as Prime Minister, adopted an amused neutrality. 
Ill health prematurely drove Masson from his post in the Militia Depart-
ment and the promoters of the Zouave regiment gave up in disgust. 26 
It would he easy to exaggerate the significance of this abortive venture 
into a specifically French Canadian military dress and tradition. The 
incident did reveal that the British military authorities and their allies 
in the Canadian Militia Department would do nothing to widen the 
character of the force to suit the wishes and traditions of French Canada. 
Their action contrasts with their willingness to sanction the equally 
inappropriate Highland costume when it was demanded by many English-
speaking battalions. For, as Masson pointed out in the course of his 
protracted transatlantic correspondence, as long as Britain kept no High-
land regiments in Canada, a group of Militia in Scottish costume would 
be as conspicuous as Zouaves in blue, green or scarlet, and far less suitably 
dressed for Canadian conditions. 27 
IV. - PERMANENT MILITARY INSTITUTIONS : 
PROFESSIONALISM. 
For most Canadians for many years, the thirty thousand odd men 
in the volunteer militia were all that the country needed as a military 
force, Insistence on economy went hand in hand with constitutional 
slogans about the dangers of standing armies. Nonetheless, governments 
were forced ·to the conclusion that to achieve even a modest level of 
efficiency, the militia would require permanent military schools. In his 
first parliamentary session, Alexander Mackenzie pushed through the 
legislation which led to the creation of the Royal Military College at 
Kingston. Eight years later, the Honorahle Adolphe Caron, as Minister of 
26 Privy Council minutes, 23 October 1879, Public Archives of Canada, R.G. 2, 7, a, 
vol. 18, p. 542; Correspondence in Public Archives of Canada, Macdonald Papers, vol. 229, 
pp. 98675-98677; vol. 301, pp. 139889·139901. 
27 Masson to Macdonald, 10 November 1879, ibid., vol. 229, p. 98679. 
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Militia, was responsible for amendments to the Militia Act which finally 
acknowledged the need for a tiny permanent army to man schools for 
cavalry, artillery and infantry. 
The new military college, opened in 1876, was the first militia 
institution to ignore the bilingual needs of the country. Entrance exam· 
inations required candidates to translate French and Latin into English 
but there was no corresponding hurdle for English-speaking candidates. 
When these and other examples of discrimination were brought to the 
attention of the Government, neither the Prime Minister nor his succes-
sion of lack-lustre Ministers of Militia seemed to understand the point. 2 ~ 
No serious concessions were made to help French-speaking entrants. 
By 1900, 255 cadets had graduated from the Royal Military College; 
only eleven were French Canadians. Even these were almost exclusively 
from upper-class and largely assimilated families. There were two Joly 
de Lotbinieres, two Panets, a DuPlessis, a Gaudet and a Boucher de 
Boucherville. 29 Repeated demands by militia reformers that commissions 
in the permanent corps he reserved for graduates of the College would 
have created a near-perfect barrier to French-Canadian representation. 
Bilingualism was hardly more successful from the other direction. 
Successive Major Generals commanding the Militia complained that cadets 
at the College knew even less French than British Officers of the same 
age - surely a modest enough standard. 30 In 1895, in the course of an 
investigation which eventually led to the removal of the Commandant 
and most of the academic staff, Major General Gascoigne found that the 
Professor of French was most conspicuously unfitted for his work. Even 
in the General's presence, he could not keep order in his class. 31 In the 
following year, when outside examiners were introduced for the first 
time to assess the level of academic achievement, the examiner in French 
reported that, while most of the graduating class could make out the 
approximate meaning of a paragraph in French, they could neither write 
a passable French letter nor even pretend to sustain a conversation. 32 
2S CANADA, HousE OF CoMMONS, Debates, 4 April 1876, pp. 1044-1045; 12 April 1877, 
pp. 1430-1431. On Mackenzie's Militia ministers, see Sister Teresa Avila BURKE, "Mackenzie 
and His Cabinet, 1873-1878", Canadian Historical Review, vol. XLI, No. 2 (June, 1960). 
29 DEPARTMENT OF MILITIA AND DEFENCE, Militia List, 1900, pp. 11-16. 
30 For example, see Major General I. J. C. Herbert to the Duke of Cambridge, 
6 July 1891, Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, CambrUlge Papers. 
31 CANADA, DEPARTMENT OF MILITIA AND DEFENCE, Reports in Reference to the 
Royal Military College for the Year 1895 (Ottawa, 1896), p. 24. See also pp. 9, 11. 
32 Militia Report, 1897, pp. 38-41. 
FRENCH CANADA AND THE CANADIAN MILITIA 41 
Another blow to bilingualism was more the unconsidered by-product 
of an administrative decision than a conscious act. In 1880, the two 
permanent batteries of artillery changed station. Most of the French-
speaking gunners found themselves transferred to the Anglo-Saxon setting 
of Kingston. Neither they nor their commander, Colonel Strange, found 
it a happy exchange. Officers resorted to political influence to return to 
Quebec while men in the ranks deserted or failed to re-enlist. The hi-
lingual character of the unit was lost within a few years. 33 
The authorization of additional permanent schools in 1883 made 
it possible again to provide specifically for French-speaking needs. One 
of the three new infantry schools was established in the crumbling bar· 
racks at St. Jean. Its first commandant was Lieutenant Colonel Gustave 
d'Odet d'Orsonnens, the grandson of a Swiss officer in de Meuron's 
regiment. D'Orsonnens had served in the militia during the Fenian Raids 
and for his services in organizing the Papal Zouaves, the Pope had made 
him a papal count. All but one of the officers under his command were 
originally French-speaking. 
In organizing the new schools, Adolphe Caron, as Minister of Militia, 
had not restricted himself to appointing graduates of the military college. 
His aim, as he explained it to a Quebec City friend was to provide "for 
some good young fellows who have a taste for military life". 34 The 
professional standards were no higher than for the militia as a whole 
and Caron found it possible to oblige many of his friends, both English. 
and French-speaking. When the British commander of the Militia objected 
to the officer nominated as d'Orsonnens' second-in-command on the grounds 
of a reputation for drunkenness, the complaint was acknowledged but 
overruled on the grounds that the gentleman was the son of a prominent 
Conservative and the grandson of a former premier of the Province of 
Canada. 35 
Caron also established a small cavalry school at Quebec City hut only 
one of its three officers was French-speaking, Lieutenant (later Major 
General) F. L. Lessard. 
33 The order exchanging the batteries did provide for a small number of French-
speaking gunners to he left at Quebec to serve as instructors (Militia General Orders, 
no. 10, 7 May 1880). For the reaction, see STRANGE, Gunner Jingo, pp. 371 et seq.; Militia 
Report, 1880, p. 236. 
34 Caron to Dr. Colin Sewell, 12 March 1883, Caron Papers, letterhook 4, p. 576. 
85 Correspondence in Macdonald Papers, vol. 83, pp. 32465-32476 passim. 
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V. - ACTIVE SERVICE AND MILITARY REFORM. 
The most serious challenge for the Canadian Militia between 1868 
and 1914 was the Northwest Rebellion of 1885. The outbreak evoked 
predictable enthusiasm among the Canadian volunteers, as anxious to 
display their military prowess as to crush the Metis. Offers of service 
bombarded the Prime Minister and his Minister of Militia. 
As Minister, Adolphe Caron was persuaded by his military advisers 
that the relatively well·organized city battalions would be sent out first. 
While two units from Toronto were the first to he selected, political 
expediency dictated that offers of service from the 9th and the 65th 
Battalions were quickly accepted. English·speaking units in Montreal 
and Quebec were left behind. 36 The commanding officers of both bat· 
talions, Lieutenant Colonels Guillaume Amyot of the 9th and J. Alderic 
Ouimet of the 65th, happened to be Conservative M.Ps., and this reinforced 
the considerable interest Caron took in their progress. 37 
French Canadian participation in the campaign provoked both major 
and minor storms. The ranks of the 9th included many undergraduates 
of Laval University and telegrams deluged the Minister from the Rector, 
priests and parents, demanding that the young men he returned to their 
studies. 38 Caron was accused of ordering a veritable slaughter of the 
innocents : " ... les maledictions pleuvent sur ceux qui les privent de 
leurs enfants" warned one correspondent. 39 The students were ordered 
hack to their desks and the ranks of the battalion were seriously depleted. 
One of the companies had only thirteen privates, another only eight. 40 
A much more serious problem was created by criticism of the French 
Canadian contribution to the campaign. The 1885 rebellion was the 
occasion for violent attacks on French Canada in some of the Ontario 
press and the role of the French-speaking battalions in the North West 
was subjected to close scrutiny. It was perhaps unfortunate that the two 
Quebec units played their role in Alberta, far from the chief centres of 
excitement. The 9th Battalion was dispersed in garrisons through the 
36 In Montreal, the Garrison Artillery, whose commanding officer was a close 
personal friend of the Minister, was called out near the end of the campaign (Lt. Col. 
W. R. Oswald to Caron, 7 April 1885, Caron Papers, file 5326). 
87 See, for example, Caron to Amyot, 1 April 1885, ibid., vol. 199, p. 90; Caron to 
Thomas McGreevy, M.P., 1 April 1885, ibid., p. 104. 
as M. E. Methot to Caron, 31 March 1885, ibid., p. 80. 
39 Anonymous to Caron, 2 April 1885, ibid., p. 142. 
40 Georges BEAUREGARD, Le. 9• Bataillon au Nord-ouest (Quebec, 1886); p .. 8. 
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Blackfeet country southwest of Calgary. The 65th joined Major General 
Strange's column, marching north to Edmonton and then down the North 
Saskatchewan in pursuit of Big Bear's hand of Crees. 
Strange, already familiar with French Canadians, was delighted by 
the men of the 65th. They were tough, spirited and uncomplaining in 
performing the arduous work of the campaign. 41 Unfortunately, neither 
Colonel Ouimet nor his second-in-command accompanied the battalion. 
Having brought his men to Calgary, Ouimet returned to Montreal, osten· 
sihly to recover some lost equipment and to take his place in Parliament. 
When Ontario papers raised a storm at this conduct, Caron ordered his 
colleague to return to the North West. 42 The command of the 65th fell 
to Major G. A. Hughes, a veteran of the Pontifical Zouaves and a more 
robust campaigner. 43 
Criticism from the English-language press went far to cancel out 
any warming sense of solidarity between French- and English-speaking 
participants in the campaign. Bitterness was focussed and aggravated by 
the much more important questions surrounding the death of Louis · Riel. 
Both Amyot and Ouimet were among the Conservative M.Ps. who split 
from their party to oppose Riel's execution. However, the constant sniping 
at the French Canadian role in the campaign, and particularly at Ouimet's 
alleged desertion of his battalion, helped turn memories of a creditable 
achievement into a sour sense of injustice. 44 
Friction was not allayed by the British general commanding the 
Militia, Major General Sir Fred Middleton. When he sought the Canadian 
appointment, Middleton had seemed eminently qualified to appreciate 
Canada's national duality. While serving in Canada some years before, 
he had married a French Canadian. Her relatives used their influence 
with Caron to secure Middleton his appointment. 45 In fact, Middleton 
rapidly developed an acute contempt for French Canadians, filled letters 
41 For Strange's comments on the 65th, see Gunner Jingo, pp. 419-420, 426, 509-510. 
See also CANADA, DEPARTMENT OF MILITIA AND DEFENCE, Report Upon the Suppression of 
the Rebellion in the North-West Territories, etc. (Ottawa, 1886), pp. 51-60. 
42 On Ouimet, see STRANGE, Gunner Jingo, p~ 419; Caron to Strange, 18 April 1885, 
Caron Papers, vol. 199, p. 285; on Major C. A. Dugas, see Dugas to Caron, 4 May 1885, 
ibid., file 5815. 
43 Hughes to Caron, 19 April 1885, ibid., vol. 199, p. 290; Benjamin SULTE, Histoire 
de la Milice canadienne-franqaise (Montreal, 1897), p. 97. 
44 For evidence of this feeling and efforts to allay it, see Strange to Caron, 
24 August 1885 and enclosures, Caron Papers, file 6619. 
45 Caron to Charles A. Doucet, 8 March 1884, Caron Papers, letterbook 7, p. 297 .. 
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to the Duke of Cambridge with his scorn for their shortcomings and 
was only concerned lest his wife, "a most decided Englishwoman now'', 
might make their joint prejudices known. 46 
In the aftermath of the campaign, militia officers had shared the 
grievance that although both Caron and Middleton had been rewarded 
for their services, there were no decorations for their subordinates. The 
blame fell on Middleton. Only on his departure in 1890 did the General 
publish a statement declaring that his list of proposed honours had been 
rejected by the Minister on the grounds that it included neither of the 
French Canadian colonels. 47 Bitterness which had been directed at the 
British general was redirected at French Canadian political influence. 
Middleton's successor was very much better suited to the needs of 
the force. Major General lvor Herbert was young, an able soldier, a man 
of means and a member of an aristocratic family. More to the point, 
Herbert was a Catholic and spoke fluent French. For the first time, the 
Militia had a commander who insisted on attending camps in the French· 
speaking districts and on instructing the troops in their own language. 48 
It was Herbert's misfortune to serve in Canada at a time when ten· 
sions between the two groups were being aggressively exploited for politi· 
cal ends. His sympathy with the French Canadians under his command 
was added to the list of offenses he accumulated as an energetic reformer. 
When Herbert included a glowing reference to the Papal Zouaves in a 
speech to the 65th Battalion, he found himself denounced on the floor 
of the House of Commons by the ardent and influential Orangeman, 
Major (later Lieutenant General Sir) Sam Hughes. 49 It was a refrain 
picked up by Ontario newspapers. 
Herbert's regime marked the slow beginning of the reform and 
modernisation of the Canadian Militia. Virtually unaltered in training 
and equipment since the British withdrawal in 1871, the force began 
to acquire new weapons and its professional instructors began to go to 
England for their training. The links with British Army doctrine and 
48 Middleton to Cambridge, 30 August 1885, Cambridge Papers. 
47 Sir Fred MIDDLETON, A Parting Address to the People of Canada (Toronto, 1890), 
pp. 9-10. 
48 Herbert also wrote to the completely bilingual Caron in French, some evidence of 
his genuine fluency in the language. See, for example, Herbert to Caron, 8 January 1891, 
Caron Papers, file 14316. 
49 HousE OF CoMMONS, Debates, 14 May 1894, pp. 2733-2734; for Herbert's speech, 
see G. A. DROLET, Zouaviana (Montreal, 1898), pp. 410-412. 
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traditions were tightened. Hitherto, professional needs had been gen-
erously leavened by political influence. The advantage of having a 
patroneux like Caron at the head of the Militia Department might he 
that considerations of merit and efficiency could he balanced by a desire-
to make the militia acceptable to French Canada. For such a directing 
policy, Herbert's linguistic skill and genuine sympathy were no substitute. 
Herbert's immediate successor was a good-natured nonentity hut, 
in 1898, came a new prophet of reform. Major General {later Lieutenant 
General Sir) Edward Hutton was a fervent Imperialist, charged by Joseph 
Chamberlain with the task of creating an efficient defence system for 
Canada. 50 It was a task for which he had already acquired considerable 
experience in Australia and soon after his arrival, he launched a vigorous 
personal campaign to invigorate the militia and to popularize military 
reform. His attentions extended to Quebec. Like Herbert, he had the 
decided asset of speaking fluent French and he used it, as in the rest of 
Canada, to deliver public speeches. At a dinner at St. Jean, attended by 
Israel Tarte and his own minister, Dr. (later Sir) Frederick Borden, 
Hutton noted that while French Canadians made up 30'fa of the popula-
tion, they provided less than 20% of the militia. No people had ever 
become truly great, he warned his audience, by the cultivation of land 
and pastoral pursuits alone. 51 
Hutton tackled the problems of the French-speaking militia units 
with the same energy he displayed in promoting other military reforms. 
Old and inefficient officers were persuaded to retire and companies which 
failed to appear for training were disbanded. One of the few remaining 
French-speaking officers in the permanent force was assigned to prepare 
a French drill book. 52 Hutton personally commanded the militia camps 
in Quebec in the summer of 1899 and made a point of organizing massive 
church parades where mass was said by the archbishops of Quebec and 
Montreal. 53 At both camps, the public was welcomed to sham battles 
during the day and to choral competitions at night. 54 
50 For Hutton's career in Canada, see Norman PENLINCTON, Canada and Imperialism, 
1896-1899 (Toronto, 1965); and "General Hutton and the Problem of Military Imperialism 
in Canada, 1898-1900", Canadian Historical Review, vol. XXIV, no. 2 (June, 1943). 
51 Montreal Gazette, 13 February 1899. 
52 'Chief Staff Officer to the District Officer Commanding, M.D. 6, 29 November 1899, 
Public Archives of Canada, R.G. 9, II B 1, Confidential Letterbook, vol. 599, p. 387. 
53 La Patrie, 26 June 1899; Le Soleil, 8 July 1899. 
M Montreal Herald, 3 July 1899; Le Soleil, 7 July 1899. 
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A constant theme in Hutton's reform campaign was the need to create 
a Canadian national army. Certainly such a force would require a much 
greater degree of bilingualism. There had even been complaints that the 
staff officer commanding a predominantly French-speaking district in 
Quebec had returned a letter to its sender because it was not written 
in English. 55 Hutton's concern for bilingualism was not merely a matter 
of abstract justice; he was also convinced that Quebec would only join 
his military crusade if" ... the more energetic and professionally educated 
English-speaking officers should get at the French Canadians". 56 
To achieve his aim, Hutton launched an historic General Order on 
February 14, 1899, the day after his highly acclaimed speech at St. Jean. 
It warned permanent officers that the Major General now considered it 
as an essential prerequisite for promotion to the staff that they should 
be able to convey their instructions to French Canadian troops in French. 
It concluded pointedly that "all those who are unable to read or speak 
French with fair facility should take an early opportunity to make good 
this defect". 57 
The order was received with predictable mixed reactions. Lieutenant 
Colonel Arthur Evanturel of the 9th Battalion, in thanking Hutton, went 
on to comment on the previous status of French in the Militia : 
Sans doute, jamais a ma connaissance du moins, on a refuse de nous 
entendre dans la langue qui nous est si chere, mais c'etait toujours avec 
crainte & hesitation que nous nous approchions des autorites qui souvent ne 
pouvaient nous suivre dans nos remarques sans etre obligees de s'en rapporter 
a des interpretes quelques fois pas experimentes. 58 
English-speaking reaction was more cool. Never before had bi-
lingualism been seriously urged as an advantage for an officer - to say 
nothing of being a pre-requisite for promotion. A few weeks later, Hutton 
used part of a speech in Toronto to defend his regulation, arguing that 
it was discreditable that staff officers did not know enough French to be 
able to handle a French-speaking battalion. 59 
55 Borden to Israel Tarte, 15 March 1898, Nova Scotia Archives, F. W. Borden 
Papers, letterbook 5, p. 768. The accusation was denied (Borden to Tarte, 22 March 1898, 
ibUJ., p. 938) . 
56 Hutton to Lt. Col. Gerald Kitson, 7 January 1899, British Museum, London, 
Hutton Papers, add. 50079. 
57 Militia General Orders, no. 12, 14 February 1899. 
58 Lt. Col. Evanturel to Hutton, 19 February 1899, Public Archives of Canada, 
Hutton Papers, pp. 467-468. 
59 Toronto Globe, 4 March 1899. For examples of comment on the order, see Toronto 
Evening Telegram, 8 March 1899, and Montreal Witness, 7 March 1899. 
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Hutton left Canada a year to the day after he had issued his bilin-
gualism order. His departure to serve with the British Army in South 
Africa was the culmination of his struggle to impose his will on the 
Canadian government and of the intolerable friction which conflicting 
policies had produced. Hutton's personal attitude had turned to a cold 
hatred of a French Canada which remained uninfected by his own imperial 
patriotism. 60 His brief encouragement to internal bilingualism in the 
Militia was soon forgotten. 
VI. - THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR AND A NEW ROLE. 
The conflict between French and English Canada over participation 
in the South African War has been studied elsewhere. Within the insti· 
tutional confines of the Militia Department, the problem resolved itself 
into the traditional concern with producing a representative force. As 
early as July, 1902, Hutton had worked out a plan for a contingent 
although his Minister and the Government were not informed of the 
details until September. 61 When Laurier finally announced the despatch 
of a contingent, its strength was smaller than Hutton had planned and 
some of the proposed appointments were altered. The essence remained. 
Canada was to send a battalion of a thousand men under the command 
of Lieutenant Colonel (later General Sir) William Otter of Toronto. 
One of the two majors was Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Pelletier, a young 
artillery officer who commanded one of the military districts in Quebec. 62 
Of the battalion's eight companies, one was to he recruited from Montreal 
and another at Quebec City. All the officers of one of these companies 
were French Canadians although a study of the nominal roll of the com-
pleted contingent suggests that there were only a few French Canadians 
in the ranks. 63 
Recruiting plans for the Second Contingent recognized the hopeless-
ness of finding a representative share of French-speaking recruits for the 
60 For evidence of Hutton's later views, see Hutton to Lord Minto, 10 January 1902, 
Public Archives of Canada, Minto Papers, vol. 17, pp. 58-59. 
61 On Hutton's plans for the contingent, see Hutton to Minto, 17 July 1899, Minto 
Papers, vol. 15, pp. 100-104. 
62 Pelletier was also the son of Sir Charles Pelletier, Government Leader in the 
Senate. In 1898, he had been only a substantive lieutenant and his rapid promotion 
reflected not merely political influence but also the lack of suitable French-speaking officers 
to command a French-speaking military district. For comment, see Canadian Military 
Gazette, vol. XII, no. 14, 21 July 1897. 
63 CANADA, PARLIAMENT, Organization, Equipment, Despatch and Service of the 
Canadian Contingents, Sessional Paper 35a, 1901. 
48 HISTOIRE SOCIALE - SOCIAL HISTORY 
rank and file but officers continued to be sought to fill a representative 
function. Lieutenant Colonel F. L. Lessard commanded one of the two 
battalions of Canadian Mounted Rifies, and one of the three batteries of 
field artillery had French Canadian officers as both commander and 
second-in-command. 64 Among the junior ranks of officers, French-speak-
ing representation was virtually non-existent. 
With the end of the South African War, Canada entered on a period 
of military expansion which continued, with only temporary checks, 
until the outbreak of war in 1914. The authorized establishment for the 
Militia, held at 35,000 or below since 1868, had nearly doubled by 1914. 
Military expenditure rose from $1,160,000 in 1898 to $9,100,000 in 1912-13. 
Annual training had been the rule since 1896 ; now it was extended and 
drill pay was substantially increased. 65 Modern equipment, guns and 
rifles were issued to the whole force. 
While French Canadian militia units shared in the general expansion 
of spending and of military opportunities, it is also apparent that their 
relative share declined. One measurable index was the French Canadian 
share of permanent force commissions. Since these were the officers who 
received the only thorough professional training and who would occupy 
the key positions in wartime, the absence of French Canadians was of 
fundamental significance. It certainly helped to explain why, when war 
came in 1914, it proved impossible to find trained and suitable French 
Canadians young enough to serve as general officers in the Canadian 
Corps. 66 
64 Although the battery commander was not a success, his subordinate, Captain 
H. A. Panet, won high praise from General Hutton, then serving in South Africa (Hutton 
to Minto, 30 October 1900, Minto Papers, vol. 16, p. 82). 
65 These key changes were embodied in the 1904 Militia Act which also did away 
with the requirement that the command of the Militia he held by a British officer. 
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Another index was participation in the Militia Staff Course, a long 
course designed to prepare senior militia officers for major staff appoint· 
ments on mobilization. By 1913, fifty-eight officers had received cer· 
tificates; only seven of them were French Canadians. 
In 1911, on the formation of the Borden Government, Colonel Sam 
Hughes became Minister of Militia. He was certainly the most militant 
and aggressive defence minister Canada has ever had. Under his com· 
mand, the national military establishment grew still faster. However, few 
ministers were less fitted by temperament, experience and political record 
to associate French Canada in the mood of militaristic enthusiasm. In 
opposition, he had made no secret of his prejudices and in office, he 
continued to go out of his way to offend French Canadian susceptibilitieL 
One order which drew wide reaction forbade the 65th Regiment from 
bearing arms in Montreal's traditional Corpus Christi procession. Not 
even protests from French-speaking and Catholic colleagues in the Cabinet 
could move Hughes to reconsider. 67 
However, Hughes was only a final irritant. By the time that he 
became Minister, the Canadian Militia, permanent and volunteer com· 
ponents alike, had already ceased to be an institution in which there 
were careers, opportunities and a sense of easy identity for Canadians of 
both founding races. It was symbolic that the most distinguished French 
Canadian soldier of the period, Major General Fran~ois Lessard, should 
find it congenial to pass his years of retirement on a farm outside 
Toronto. 68 
VII. - WHAT UNDERLAY THE FAILURE? 
While the role of the Militia Department in Canadian affairs between 
1867 and 1914 was peripheral, the failure of French Canada to associate 
with English Canada in military affairs was not. The faifore was due to 
far more profound causes than the organization of the Department of 
Militia and Defence or the narrow prejudices of many of its leading 
officials. No suggestion has been made that the problem can be torn out of 
its wider context. 
67 For documentation of the incident, see La Presse, 8 June 1914 and Public Archh·es 
of Canada, R. L. Borden Papers, OC 190, vol. 17, pp. 15614·15619. 
68 J. F. CUMMINS, "A Distinguished Canadian Cavalry Officer: Major·General F. L. 
Lessard, C.B.", Canadian Defence Quarterly, vol. III, no. 2, January 1926, p. 131. 
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At the same time, institutional factors did contribute to this· failure. 
Some of them can he summarized here : 
1. · At no time did military and civil authorities agree that a special 
approach would he needed to attract French Canadians to the Militia. 
Masson's support for a Zouave uniform and Hutton's encouragement 
for bilingualism were isolated episodes, abandoned in the face of 
opp<>sition. 
2. With the exception ·of the infantry school at St. Jean, little thought 
was given to the need for instructional facilities for the French-
speaking Militia. W•hen higher qualifications were demanded, particu-
larly for officers, a thorough knowledge of English was a prerequisite. 
3~ · Military service, parti~ularly in the permanent corps, meant travel 
and the 'breaking of ties, a much more difficult process for a French 
' ' Canadian than for an English Canadian who would at least find his 
·own language, customs and attitudes in almost all parts of Canada 
and even in England. 
In 1883, speaking in the House of Commons, Lieutenant Colonel 
J. A. Ouimet had suggested that the Canadian Militia was not maintained 
for offence nor, indeed, for defence. Its purpose, he suggested, was to 
build up a national spirit : 
... I look upon the Militia as a national institution, the promotion of 
w}iich is the. best means of creating among our population a na.tional feeling, 
a real Canadian feeling. 69 
Ouimet's vision was not realized. The failure to find more than a 
superficial place for both Canadian traditions in the country's armed 
forces before 1914 was to have serious consequences in two world wars. 
69 HousE OF CoMMONS, Debates, 19 April 1883, p. 725. 
